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This paper deals with risk and uncertainties that are an inherent part of design-
ing and implementing fisheries rebuilding plans. Such risk and uncertainties 
stem from a variety of sources, biological, economic and/or political factors, 
and are influenced by external factors like changing environmental conditions. 
The aim of this paper is to characterize such risks and uncertainties and to as-
sess the importance of it in relation to the performance of fisheries rebuilding 
plans, to give some examples where uncertainties have negatively affected the 
ability of rebuilding plans to reach their intended targets and to give some 
guidelines how to deal with risk and uncertainties.  
 
The conclusion is that when designing fisheries rebuilding plans, it should be 
taken into account the availability of relevant information, such that progress is 
(indisputable) measurable, and causes of potential failure can be clarified. Re-
building plans need to consider biological, economic and distributional conse-
quences in order to reduce uncertainties and to ensure successful implementa-
tion of the plan. Risk communication is also valuable in the process, since it 
gives transparency of the objectives and means to meet these objectives, eluci-
dates crucial information from stakeholders and legitimates the whole process 
of designing and implementing the rebuilding plans, which is essential for the 
success of these plans. To that end the plans should be as simple and realistic as 
possible. It is recommended to apply risk analysis and to use the precautionary 
principle only in cases where large uncertainties exists and/or potentially high 
costs exits of ignoring the uncertainty cannot be resolved. Two fisheries re-
building plans are analysed and how they address risk and uncertainties are 
evaluated. 
 
This study was done under contract with the OECD. The authors are grateful to 





1.  Introduction ................................................................................................... 7 
2.  Risk and uncertainty .................................................................................... 10 
2.1.  Definition of risk .............................................................................. 11 
2.2.  Distinction between risk and uncertainty ......................................... 11 
2.3.  Risk assessment and risk management ............................................. 12 
2.4.  Different type and sources of risk/uncertainties ............................... 13 
2.5.  Different sources of risk/uncertainties .............................................. 15 
2.6.  Combining different types and source of risk and uncertainty ......... 19 
3.  Describing rebuilding plans: Design, implementation and 
monitoring ................................................................................................... 20 
3.1.  Rebuilding plans ............................................................................... 20 
3.2.  Design .............................................................................................. 23 
3.3.  Implementation................................................................................. 26 
3.4.  Monitoring ........................................................................................ 27 
4.  How risks and uncertainties can influence outcomes of rebuilding 
plans............................................................................................................. 28 
4.1.  Risks and uncertainties related to design of the rebuilding plan ...... 29 
4.2.  Risks and uncertainties related to implementation and monitoring of 
the rebuilding plan  ............................................................................ 30 
5.  Risk (and uncertainty) assessment and management and 
communication ............................................................................................ 31 
5.1.  Review the methods and mechanisms for assessing risk and 
uncertainties ..................................................................................... 31 
5.2.  How to deal with imperfect and incomplete data ............................. 32 
5.3.  Communication of risk and uncertainties ......................................... 33  
6.  Examples of cases where risk and uncertainties have not been 
addressed ..................................................................................................... 35 
6.1.  North Sea cod ................................................................................... 35 
6.2.  US fisheries rebuilding plans ........................................................... 39 
7.  Conclusion and guidelines ........................................................................... 42 
8.  References ................................................................................................... 45  
7 
1.  Introduction 
This paper is concerned with fisheries rebuilding plans and the risks and uncer-
tainties attached to them. Fisheries rebuilding plans are now in place for many 




A fishery rebuilding plan differs from ordinary regulation/management of fish-
eries in a number of respects. It formulates a target, typically that the stock 
should be above a certain reference level, where the stock is at minimum risk, 
formulated in terms of target biomass and target fishing mortality. But is also 
formulates a roadmap how to end there, including what regulatory instruments 
to use, how to monitor and enforce the plan, and how to deal with possible di-
vergence from the planned path. The management part transforms the assess-
ment into management actions, e.g. Total Allowable Catches (TAC), technical 
measures or number of fishing days, while the implementation of the plan and 
monitoring of the fishery determines the actual catches, revenues and cost and 
hence the profit. The design is based on assessments of stock biomass and fish-
ing mortality and of economic parameters and outlooks.  
 
Fisheries rebuilding plans must both be designed and must perform under a va-
riety of risks and uncertainties, including e.g. inherent biological uncertainty, 
influence by external factors (e.g. changing environmental conditions or 
changes in demand or technological development) and under the interaction of 
many players (fishermen or countries), but also uncertainties related to eco-
nomic and market factors. 
                                                            
1   There exist different definitions of what constitutes a collapse. According to Cooke (1984), a 
collapse is a sustained period of very low catch values after a period of high catch values. Mul-
lon et al. (2005) identify three types of collapse, a smooth collapse, e.g., a long regular decline 
of caches, an erratic collapse where a large fall is experienced after several ups and downs, and 
a plateau shaped that implies a sudden fall after a long relatively stable period. According to 
their estimates, almost half of the collapses are of an erratic type, while the most unpredictable, 
the plateau shaped accounts for almost one out of four cases.  
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The aim of this paper is to characterize and define such risks and uncertainties, 
to analyze their importance in relation to the performance of the rebuilding 
plan, to give some examples where uncertainties have negatively affected the 
ability of rebuilding plans to deliver as supposed and finally to give some 
guidelines how to deal with risk and uncertainties.  
 
But before that, it is appropriate to define properly the terms risk and uncer-
tainty. In decision making theory, there is a clear distinction between risk and 
uncertainties. Risk is the probability of the occurrence of an event multiplied by 
the consequence, if it occurs. The consequences have to be measurable, e.g., 
weight, money, composition of the fish stock etc. Decision making under risk 
implies that all the consequences of a decision are known and a distribution 
function over all possible consequences is known. In comparison, a situation 
where it is not possible to calculate the risk, such that no probabilities can be at-
tached to the consequences, is denoted decision making under uncertainty. (If 
even less information is known, i.e., the consequences not known, is sometimes 
denoted decision making under ignorance). In the presence of uncertainty it is 
no longer possible to make decisions based upon calculating expected values. 
Other criteria, based upon maximin or precautionary principle are, however, 
admissible to apply to evaluate policies. However, the definition of and distinc-
tion between of risk and uncertainties are not universally agreed upon, and in 
the rest of this paper we will only make a distinction between those two con-
cepts if it is needed. Risk and uncertainties will in the sequel denote any situa-
tion where the decision makers at the time they choose an action, cannot deter-
mine with certainty the consequence this action will imply.  
 
Several types of risk and uncertainties are relevant when analyzing rebuilding 
plans. Economic risk comes partly from the demand side, via fluctuating market 
prices, due to either changes in consumer preferences or market conditions 
(changes in competition), or from the supply side through changes in factor 
prices, changes in technologies, and credit conditions. Risk from a biological or 
environmental perspective comes around partly due to an inherent uncertainty  
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about the state of nature and its dynamics in itself, but partly also due to uncer-
tainties in prediction the consequence of proposed regulation. Such uncertain-
ties are related to difficulties in estimating recruitments and stock growth. In 
management advices as practiced by e.g. the International Council for the Ex-
ploitation of the Sea (ICES) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-
stration (NOAA), evaluation of risk and uncertainties is largely related to con-
servation reference points for the stock and fishing mortality in the fishery, 
which in turn, e.g., are assumed to represent states with increased probability of 
impaired recruitment. Risk and uncertainties also stems from the 
political/institutional reality and potentially changes herein. E.g., how changes 
in policy measures, or regulatory systems, affect the possibilities to achieve a 
specific target. Further, the uncertainties might impact the design of the man-
agement plan, e.g. the choice of instruments. There are uncertainties involved in 
implementation and monitoring of any rebuilding plan, e.g. how is the TACs 
transformed into actual harvest. Both economic, environmental, biological and 
political risk, therefore, have a potential influence on outcomes of rebuilding 
plans. 
 
The paper presents and analyses two actual rebuilding plans in the context of 
risk and uncertainty. Focus is in partuicular on which types of uncertainties are 
present, how they have been handled in the design process, and how the 
uncertinaties involved have impacted on the success of the rebuilding plan. The 
first is the North Sea cod rebuilding plan and the second one involves fisheries 
rebuilding plans from USA using the Pacific Groundfish Fishery as an example. 
 
A number of proposed guidelines emerge from the analysis. Fisheries rebuild-
ing plans should be dealt with by applying a formal decision making process, in 
combination with a formal risk analysis. The benefits of such a process are that 
it elucidates the importance of risk and uncertainties, and gives valuable in-
sights to how best to manage these risk and uncertainties. As an example, it 
could show how to reduce uncertainties by deliberate choice of regulatory in-
struments. Moreover the possibility of measurement of progress and the avail- 
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ability of relevant data should be considered explicitly already when designing 
the rebuilding plan. To reduce implementation uncertainties, it is warranted to 
consider both biological as well as economic consequences, and formal risk 
communication should be used. Finally, the precautionary approach should be 
applied in accordance with the level of uncertainty.  
 
Overall, the relevance of incorporating economic consequences for the fish 
industry must be stressed. Otherwise, the implentation is compromised, because 
the likely reaction and adaptation of the fishermen to the plan is not foreseen. In 
the presence of uncertainties, and in order to get acceptance of the implication 
of the rebuilding plan from affected parties (the fishermen), risk communcation 
is, moreover, a necessary tool. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 risk and uncertainties are de-
scribed for fisheries rebuilding plans followed by the definition and describtion 
of rebuilding plans in terms of design, implementation and monitoring in 
section 3. Section 4 discusses how risk and uncertainties can influence 
outcomes of rebuilding plans, while risk (and uncertainty) assessment and 
management and communication are covered in section 5. Two examples of 
rebuilding plans are in section 7 discussed and evaluated with respect to cases 
where risk and uncertainties have or have not been addressed. Section 7 
contains conclusions and proposed guidelines. 
2.  Risk and uncertainty 
This section aims at describing the risk and uncertainty present in fisheries and 
rebuilding plans. It provides the definition of risk, risk assessment and risk 
management, the distinction between risk and uncertainty and considers differ-
ent types and sources of risk and uncertainties.  
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2.1.  Definition of risk 
Risk refers to the possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences 
that affect aspects of what humans’ value (Fischhoff et al. 1984, Vlek 1996). 
Risk analysis is both a descriptive and a normative concept. It includes the 
analysis of cause-effect relationships, but it also signal implicitly to reduce un-
desirable effects through either appropriate modification of the causes or, 
though less desirable, mitigation of the consequences. 
2.2.  Distinction between risk and uncertainty 
While risk generally refers to the possibility of suffering harm or a loss, in en-
gineering and the physical sciences, for example, the term “risk” is taken to be 
probability multiplied with consequences. In psychology, risk is rather seen as a 
function of subjectively perceived utilities and probabilities of their occurrence 
(See. e.g., Slovic et al., 2004). But in decision making theory risk has yet an-
other meaning, and most be distinguished from uncertainty and ignorance. De-
cision making under risk implies that all consequences of any action/decision is 
known, i.e. a value attached to it and a probability distribution over possibly 
consequences is known. Table 1 shows terms and implications. Broader, uncer-













Table 1. The three basic elements in risk theory 
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ply e.g. maximin 
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2.3.  Risk assessment and risk management 
In risk analysis, two distinct operations are identified as risk assessment and 
risk management. Risk assessment is the scientific process of defining the com-
ponents of risk in precise, usually in quantitative terms. In technical risk as-
sessments, this means specifying what is at stake, calculating the probabilities 
for (un)wanted consequences, and aggregating both components by multiplying 
the probabilities by the magnitude of the effects. Risk management refers to the 
process of reducing the risks to a level deemed tolerable by decision maker (e.g. 
society) and to assure control, monitoring, and public communication. Risk as-
sessment has been discussed in a fisheries context. According to Hilborn et al. 
(2001), risk assessment aims primarily at evaluating the consequences of vari-
ous harvest strategies in terms of probability statements about future trends in 
yield, biomass and collapse of the stock, while risk management involves find-
ing and implementing management policies, strategies and tactics to reduce the 
risk to the communities exploiting them (Hilborn et al. 2001). Therefore the  
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concepts of risk assessment and risk management refer to situations of risk, un-
certainty and ignorance.
2  
2.4.  Different type and sources of risk/uncertainties 
Risks and uncertainties can be grouped with respect to either type or source. 
The type relates to whether the risk and uncertainties come from economic, en-
vironmental, biological or political sphere. The second grouping relates to the 
underlying source of uncertainty.  
 
The first type of risk can be identifiable as economic risk. Economic uncer-
tainty relates to the fishing industry, demand and supply side (price effects) and 
behavioural assumptions about fishermen. Uncertain factors here are the profit-
ability of the industry under various regulation regimes, which depends on mar-
ket effects, via fluctuating market prices, due to either changes in consumer 
preferences or market conditions (changes in competition), and partly from the 
supply side through changes in factor prices, changes in technologies, and 
credit conditions. Another area of uncertainty relates to the behaviour of the 
fishermen /industry (conditioned on the development of profitability). Such be-
haviour influences relevant variables like overfishing, discard, illegal landing or 
                                                            
2   The combined operations of risk assessment and risk management can also be conceptualized 
in a DPSIR framework (DPSIR; Driving forces, pressure, state, impacts, response). Another 
model of this type is the OECD pressure-state-response (PSR) model. Even though these mod-
els are developed for analyzing environmental problems, it also can yield an appropriate 
framework for analyzing risk /rebuilding stock. See Caddy (2004), Page 1310, Figure 3 for an 
attempt to apply the DPSIR model to fisheries. Drivers could be human activities or environ-
mental conditions which exert pressure in terms of overfishing or overcapacity on the re-
source/stock resulting in changes in the state of the resource, which in turn result in impacts. 
The impacts could e.g. be a decline of the profitability of the fishery, e.g. a decline in stock size 
or even collapse of fishery. Society’s response to changes in pressure or state (or impact) is 
then with policies or programs intended to prevent, reduce or mitigate the pressure or the socio-
economic damages/costs that occurred as a result of the original pressures. The link to risk as-
sessment and management is obvious: Risk assessment is to evaluate the change in state and 
the resulting impact on human welfare. Risk management is to propose policy options that can 
mitigate the risk.   
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overcapacity (and hence, also the likelihood that the rebuilding plan turns out 
successful). Expectation about profitability/possibilities for the fisher-
men/industry also influences the process of determining the design of the re-
building plan. 
 
The second type of risk relates to the uncertainty about how climatic and envi-
ronmental conditions affect the link between the changed efforts of the fisher-
men as described in the rebuilding plan and the resulting change in the biologi-
cal variable that has to be recovered. As an example, whether observed hydro-
logical condition can be attributed to either natural and hence temporal variation 
or climate change induced permanent trends has implication on whether the re-
building should be revised or not.
3 These types of uncertainties influence the 
likelihood of achieving the stated goals, and affect how to handle divergence 
from an expected rebuilding path. For example, the main human threats to 
North and Baltic Seas marine environment are identified as effects of climate 
changes, fisheries, nutrient (eutrophication), and pollution inputs from a number 
of different sources (COM, 2005). Furthermore, the marine ecosystem is still 
being endangered by shipping, raw material encroachments, agriculture and 
tourism. In the future, pressure on marine ecosystems is likely to increase due 
to the offshore use of wind energy, but such effects are uncertain, too.  
 
The third type of risk is biological risk related to the fish stock and its develop-
ment. The risk and uncertainties attached relates to the lack of understanding or 
the lack of possibility of observing how the stock evolves in light of the 
changes in fishing activity implied by the rebuilding plan. This is in particular 
critical when there is a risk of collapse, which is the most severe biological risk. 
Moreover, there is uncertainty attached to the exact rebuilding of a stock, if the 
stock is below a certain threshold level. In the case of threshold stock levels, be-
low which rebuilding is slow or impossible due to badly or wrongly understood 
biological factors, like year to year recruitment, the risk is that the planned 
                                                            
3   Another uncertainty is how the level of nitrogen influences stock size (eutrophication) (e,g, 
Baltic Sea cod). See also Salomon (2004).  
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changes by the invoking of the rebuilding plan do not increase the stock as de-
sired. Evaluation of risk is largely related to conservation reference points for 
the stock and fishery, which in turn are assumed to represent states with in-
creased probability of impaired recruitment. 
 
Finally, political risk occurs from the political/institutional reality and changes 
herein. E.g., how changes in policy measures, or regulatory systems, affect the 
possibilities to achieve a specific target. As will be discussed in the next subsec-
tion, how fishermen or the fishing industry in general react to changes implied 
by the rebuilding plan is also uncertain. Both with respect to the pressure the 
industry puts on the decision makers (in terms of e.g., lobby pressure to in-
crease TAC), or in terms of changes in actual fishing behaviour. This could be 
with respect to changes in discards or changes in entry and exit decisions. Such 
factors are uncertain, and might compromise the ability of the rebuilding plan to 
achieve its proposed target (the implementation issue). 
2.5.  Different sources of risk/uncertainties 
We now turn to the grouping of risk and uncertainties with respect to different 
source of risk and uncertainties. This section builds heavily on Francis and 
Shotton (1997). According to the authors, the sources of uncertainties can be 
categorized into six groups, those associated with process, observation, model, 
estimation, implementation, and institutions. 
 
Process uncertainty: Due to real uncertainties, as a result of random or chaotic 
processes. This type of uncertainty arises often from natural variability, not er-
ror. The most common example of process uncertainty in the fisheries risk lit-
erature is inter-annual variability in recruitment. But it can also include eco-
nomic processes and processes describing e.g., behaviour of economic agents 
(fishermen). Unexpected reactions to rebuilding plans (e.g. increasing discards) 
can be seen as process uncertainty.  
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Observation uncertainty:  Arises in the process of data collection, through 
measurement and sampling errors. Landings data and survey data forms to-
gether the data input to the stock assessment process. No assessment is better 
than the data and landings data do often not reflect the catch data. In ICES sev-
eral stock assessments are supplemented by official data about discards. This 
initiative will reduce the observation uncertainty, all things equal. 
 
Model uncertainty: The term “model” refers to the conceptual model that fish-
eries scientists, managers and economists use as an aid in making inferences 
and decisions. Biologists model fish populations and fisheries, and economists 
use models to describe the structural and behavioural drives of the economy. 
Risk and uncertainties in modelling has at least three different origins. First, the 
wrong model would be used, secondly, the model could be inadequate and fi-
nally, exhibit misperceived relationships. In biology, such failures could be 
caused by lack of information about the correct structure (e.g., is the stock–
recruit relationship asymptotic or domed?). Another model uncertainty is the 
use of single-species models or multispecies models in the assessment. In many 
cases the models give different prediction of the stock development. Finally, 
model uncertainties are from an economic point of view related to correct mod-
elling of market conditions (demand and supply), and of modelling behaviour 
of economic agents. 
 
Estimation uncertainty: Relates to the process of parameter estimation. Even 
in the case where e.g., the right model has been proposed, parameters in the 
model must be estimated. An example here is the estimation of recruitments. 
Even if the recruitment of a species follows a Beverton-Holt function, the pa-
rameters in the model must be estimated on basic of incomplete knowledge 
(like the proliferation rate of the carrying capacity). Such estimation uncertain-
ties appear whenever estimation requires data and a formula, or algorithm, 
which implies a model.  
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Implementation uncertainty: Relates to the uncertainty about the extent to 
which management policies will be successfully implemented. For example 
with unsuccessful implementation, the objectives stated in a rebuilding plan 
may not be achieved. The risk associated with various management rebuilding 
plans depends in part on how effectively they are likely to be implemented, 
which again is dependent on whether the objectives of the management and in-
dustry are aligned or differ substantially. It follows that if the incentives of the 
fishermen are not foreseen and very different from what the management has 
expected (the “incentives gap”) the implementation uncertainty is high.  
 
Institutional uncertainty: While implementation uncertainties relates to reach-
ing effective plans, institutional uncertainties relates to uncertainty in the proc-
ess of defining an effective plan in the first place. Institutional barriers like dif-
ficulties in proper risk communication from regulator to fishermen, or problems 
associated with the interaction of the individuals and groups (scientists, econo-
mists, fishermen, etc.) that compose the management process. One type of insti-
tutional uncertainty is associated with the lack of well-defined social, economic, 
and political objectives in fisheries management. Stephenson and Lane (1995) 
claim that part of the reason for many fishery failures in recent decades are that 
“objectives have been broad, ill-defined, and in many cases not operationally 
feasible.” Finally, distributional issue also contribute to the uncertainty: A re-
building plan normally implies a short term reduction of fisheries effort. If the 
industry initially is in a (close to) zero-profit situation (e.g., because of inability 
to control investments in capacity), such limitations will imply a short term 
loss, leading to exit from the industry. Once the stock is rebuild and properly 
managed, profitability increases, and pressure for entry increases, such that 
those who have to bear the costs not necessarily are those who reap the benefit 
of such investment. The uncertainty surrounding such dynamics is important to 
understand, in particular related to acceptance of the plan from the fish industry. 
As an example of how instrument choice can reduce uncertainty, is the system 
of individual transferable quotas, which secures that those who bear the costs  
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also are those who reap the full benefit, reducing implementation uncertainty 
considerably. 
 
Follow up: Finally, the stated uncertainties should not be looked at in isolation. 
A now classical example how economic, political and biological uncertainties 
can interplay and yield a worsening of the fisheries situation is given by 
Ludwig et al (1993). The driven forces are described as economic and political 
incentives (forces).
 The effect, labelled as a ratchet effect works as follows: 
Given natural fluctuations in the stock size, in “good” years additional invest-
ment will be made. However, when the stock decreases to a size smaller than 
“normal” size, the industry appeals to government for help. The response is 
subsidies (direct or indirect). The effect is to encourage overharvesting. The 
ratchet effect is that no (or insufficient) limits are put on harvest investment 
during high stock levels but political pressure not to disinvest during low stock 
levels are added. This reasoning has been used by Hennesey and Healey (2000) 
to explain the collapse of the stocks of the principal groundfish species off New 
England. Therefore, we add a phase called the follow-up phase, which essential 
is the situation where the recovery plan has succeeded, and how the fishery has 
to be managed so that it remains “well-managed”, with respect to economic and 
biological variables. Considerations of this phase also have implication on the 
achievement of the recovery plan, and examples are added in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Main types and sources of risk and uncertainties in fisheries
4 
2.6.  Combining different types and source of risk and uncertainty 
We are now in the position to describe /categorize the risk and uncertainty in-
herent in the process of fisheries management using the tools from section 2.3 
through 2.5. This is done in Table 2. In the risk assessment matrix of Table 2, 
                                                            
4   For ease of exposition, we have excluded institutional uncertainty. 
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we have summarized the sources and types of risk uncertainties that have been 
discussed in this section. The table is by no means comprehensive, but has two 
overall functions. First, it shows the many different sources of risk and uncer-
tainties that potentially affects a fishery rebuilding plan. Second, it can be used 
to structure the risk assessment of actual rebuilding plans. 
 
The table reads as follows. E.g., the first entry in the matrix considers the cell 
representing the economic process uncertainties. These uncertainties are caused 
mainly by difficulties in predicting fluctuating prices and profitability. The 
source to e.g. fluctuating prices is process uncertainties. 
3.  Describing rebuilding plans: Design, implementation 
and monitoring 
In this chapter we develop a framework for rebuilding plans. We describe the 
necessary content of fisheries rebuilding plans and explore issues related to de-
sign, implementation and monitoring. 
3.1.  Rebuilding plans 
Rebuilding plans typically (or ideally should) include  
 
1.  Specification of a target or targets of the plan. 
2.  A realistic timeframe and/or rebuilding path for reaching the target.  
3.  Implementation of the rebuilding plan (i.e. restricting fishing effort by re-
ducing the TAC). 
4.  Monitoring, compliance and control of the fishery. 
5.  The level of observation with the development in the catches, stock, eco-
nomic parameters etc. 
6.  A rule of adjustment of the plan. 
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Each of these points can be linked to the set-up of Table 2, to indicate the risks 
and uncertainties related to each of these points. As an example of this, consider 
the first point. 
 
Rebuilding plans first of all must specify a target, a timeframe and an approach 
path. Targets can be specific stock sizes or fish mortality levels or can be for-
mulated as threshold levels which the manager wants the fish stock to be above 
and the fishing mortality to be below. How the targets are specified, influences 
the level of uncertainties. In considering this, one could go back to Table 2, and 
consider, e.g., if targets are specified as number of fish, uncertainties might ap-
pear in all of the mentioned biological categories, if targets are specified in 
profits, uncertainties to measuring this has to be considered. However, in a 
proper analysis, all types of risks and uncertainties should be considered for all 
parts of the plan.  
 
The limited reference point approach can be used for threshold or targets in the 
fisheries rebuilding plans. The following four are normally used: 
 
Blim: (Danger level) scientists have proposed it as the limit below which the 
stock must never be allowed to decline.  
Bpa: (precautionary level) is set at a higher level which gives reasonable cer-
tainty for that in spite of year to year fluctuations the stock will stay above Blim. 
Flim: the level of fishing mortality at which there is an unacceptably high risk 
that stocks will collapse. 
Fpa: a lower level of fishing mortality which offers a high probability that (Flim) 
will never be reached. 
 
The starting point of the rebuilding plan is that the current fishery policy has 
lead to a degradation of the stock (with a high risk of going below a threshold 
level (Blim), where the reproduction level is impaired). In this case, there will of- 
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ten be uncertainties about the actual size of the stock biomass,
5 and the level of 
Blim,
6
  and the causes for the low size of the stock, e.g. too high fishing mortal-
ity, or natural variations, or changes in the climatic trend. 
 
Once the target(s) and a timeframe have been set, several policy actions must be 
taken to get there. The choice and level of regulatory instruments must be de-
cided. If TAC is used, then the reduction of TAC has to be decided together 
with decisions about how to allocate the fishing opportunities. Another option is 
to use number of fishing days as an instrument and hence the allocation of lim-
ited number of fishing days is the main policy measure. Given these choices 
which indirectly determine the expected level of compliance, the decision mak-
ers have to determine the level of control of the fishermen, together with the 
level of observations about development in stock and fish mortality. If observa-
tions show that the regulation differs from planned path, the plan most contains 
the possibilities of adjustment (subject to an assessment of the causes for diver-
gence).  
 
This can lead to the construction of a rebuilding plan as seen in several coun-
tries (Caddy and Agnew, 2004). In considering the feasibility of a plan to 
achieve the stated goal (s), a number of uncertainties must be dealt with. For 
this purpose, the framework specified in Table 2 can be applied, which we will 
do in section 4. Here we continue with a more detailed description of issues re-
lated to the issues of design, implementation and monitoring. 
 
                                                            
5   In many cases the fishery has experienced yearly catches close to 100% indicating very tight 
regulations. This often leads to lower quality of the catch statistics. Therefore, assessment of 
the stock biomass can be very complicated and with high interval of confidence. 
6   This is often an evaluation of scientists based on studies of stock-recruitment relationships and 
past observations of the biomass level.  
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3.2.  Design 
Basically, there are two fundamental different ways of thinking about the de-
sign issue. The first which is based on the approach of optimal control theory, 
treat fisheries as a rocket that can be steered to a given target. In this approach 
the policy variables or decision variables can be adjusted or fine-tuned so the 
fishery will end up at the steady-state target biomass with an annual constant 
exploitation rate and harvest. If outside the steady-state, the approach path is 
towards the steady-state point again. The second way of thinking is an approach 
where the policy continuously is changed based on updated information about 
the status of the fish stock and may be other parameters. None of these ap-
proaches are likely to function in practice. Management of fisheries is not an 
optimal control problem, as already seen in section 2, because of the inherent 
biological uncertainty, influence by external factors (e.g. changing environ-
mental conditions or continuous changes in demand or technological develop-
ment) and the numbers of players (fishermen or countries) involved. Further, 
the results of management plans are often long term, i.e. over at least 7-10 
years, because it is typical long lived species that are managed by rebuilding 
plans. This will depend on how the species in question and the ecosystem in 
general will react and adjust to changes in fishing pattern. Overfishing can take 
several forms, including recruitment or/and growth overfishing and the applied 
means in the plan has to be appropriate with the type of overfishing.
7 
 
The design of a rebuilding fishery plan has to address these issues if it is going 
to be successful. A rebuilding fishery plan often has as the overall objective to 
increase the stock biomass above Blim. There are several problems with such a 
goal. First, the fish stock is not measured exactly, but it is assessed based on 
survey data and catch data. Second, changes in the fish stock might be related to 
external environmental factors. This can change both the growth rate and the 
                                                            
7   Roughly speaking, recruitment overfishing is when the harvest level is too high leading the 
problems with the reproductivity of the stock, while growth overfishing is when the individuals 
of stock are harvested at a too small size.   
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carrying capacity and therefore also impact the level of stock biomass. Third, it 
might be difficult to define exactly what is meant by a recovered stock, i.e. to 
agree on a target level. 
 
The decision variable in rebuilding plans is very often the exploitation ratio, 
normally defined as the fishing mortality rate. One has to be careful here, be-
cause the fishing mortality rate is an instantaneously rate, while the exploitation 
ratio often is the yearly removal of fish in percentage. There is, however, a rela-
tionship between them, e.g. fishing mortality rates at 0.1 or 1.0 correspond to 
removal ratio per year at 10% and 64% respectively.
8 It is clear that none of 
these variable is a real control variable because of two things. First, the fishing 
authorities do not control directly the exploitation. Secondly, the uncertain 
stock biomass is included in both variables. This means that if the aim is to 
have a removal ratio at 30% then if the stock biomass is negative impacted by 
external factors then the catch quantities have to be reduced even further to 
reach the target of a ratio at 30%. 
 
In the literature several theoretical papers are published on optimal harvest level 
with uncertainty. Adding a simple uncertainty term to the growth function does 
not fundamentally change the functional form of the optimal harvest rate rule 
(Reed 1979), only the optimal escapement level increases and often only a little 
(Conrad and Clark 1987). The harvest rule is, as in the deterministic case, to set 
the harvest to zero below a certain stock level and above this stock level to keep 
the escapement constant, meaning that the harvest rate increases with the stock 
level. It is well known from the literature that the uncertainty has to be more 
complex in order to change the harvest rule. When there is uncertainty about the 
stock size, then the optimal policy change. The harvest rule is not a constant es-
capement rule and the harvest begins at lower levels of recruitment, while at 
higher recruitment levels optimal escapement is higher (Clark and Kirkwood 
1986). 
                                                            
8   The exact relationship is u = 1 – exp(-F), where u is the yearly removal fraction and F is the in-
stantaneous fishing mortality. This formulation can be extended to include natural mortality.  
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Roughgarden and Smith (1996) introduce three types of uncertainties; in the 
growth function, in the measurement of the stock and in the implementation of 
the harvest/quota. They show (by numerical simulation) that the optimal stock 
size increases with increasing uncertainties. Thereby and therefore they suggest 
a target stock size of ¾ of the carrying capacity K. They apply a model for a 
fishery without the marginal stock effect, i.e. where the harvest does not depend 
on the stock size. 
 
In Sethi et al. (2005) these three uncertainties are modeling in a bio-economic 
framework where the trade-offs involved are explicitly included, not ad hoc as 
in Roughgarden and Smith (1996). They show that with low uncertainty in gen-
eral or large growth uncertainty, the optimal policy does not change much com-
pared to the deterministic case. The optimal policy is, however, not a constant 
escapement policy, but very close to, indeed. Harvest begins at around 45-50% 
of the carrying capacity in the numerical example. With large implementation 
uncertainty of the quota, the optimal policy is still very similar. However, the 
harvest begins at a little lower level of the measured stock than above and the 
escapement level increases with higher stock levels. But with large uncertainty 
in the measurement of the stock, the optimal policy changes a lot. The harvest 
begins at a much lower level of the measured stock (in the numerical example 
at about 30% of carrying capacity) and is increasing with higher stock level, but 
at a rate lower than one, meaning that the escapement level increases with in-
creases in stock level and eventually becomes larger than the level from the 
constant escapement policy. This last effect is due to the situation where a large 
measurement of the stock has a high probability of being wrong and hence it 
pays to leave a higher portion in the ocean. 
 
These results do not include a growth function with depensation, i.e. at low 
stock levels the growth in the stock is not sufficient for replacement. This in-
creases the risk of collapse of the fisheries. In the models, the only way the 
fishery can collapse is with harvest levels above the stock size or continuing  
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harvesting at levels above the growth rate of the stock. A growth function with 
depensation calls for a more conservative policy, see section 4.1 below).  
 
Another part of the literature study cases where it is optimal for some species to 
let the fishery collapse (see e.g. Amundsen and Bjørndal 1999). We do not ex-
plore this issue further here, because such policies do not correspond with the 
objectives of most fishery plans and politics. 
 
To sum up, the result from the literature is to have positive harvest rates at stock 
levels above 30% of the carrying capacity when confronted with measurement 
uncertainty. The harvest rate will increase at a rate lower than one with in-
creases in stocks. This will ensure that the risk of a collapse is very small given 
the uncertainties in the growth rate, in the implementation of the quota and in 
the measurement of the stock size. This risk might increases for species which 
growth functions include depensation. This will call for a more conservative 
harvest policy. 
3.3.  Implementation 
Implementation of the rebuilding plan involves a choice of management meas-
ures. Is quotas or input controls (or both) applied? And is it possible to use price 
regulation or landing taxes? As we will demonstrate latter (chapter 6) the issue 
of management measures is not a part of the two rebuilding plans we have in-
vestigated in detail. 
 
Sutinen (1999) analyses a large number of management plans in OECD coun-
tries. He groups management measures into three, output control, input control 
and technical measures. Output control includes Total Allowable Catch (TAC), 
individual quotas and vessel catch limits. Input controls are in the form of lim-
ited licenses, individual effort quotas and other gear and vessel restrictions and 
finally technical measures including size and sex selectivity and time and area 
closures. Each of these measures was evaluated with respect to biological, eco- 
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nomic, social, and administrative consequences. One of the conclusions in the 
analysis is that no single measure is superior in all respects. Most interesting is 
that TAC-regulation combined with technical measures, which is the backbone 
of many rebuilding plans, has shown to have serious flaws. Sutinen (1999, page 
1056) concludes that “TAC management results in a race-to-fish with all its at-
tendant effects and generally has not effectively prevented over-exploitation of 
resources. Effects of over-capitalization, shortened seasons, market gluts, and 
increased harvesting and processing costs are particularly evident.” Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have, however, also shortcomings, most problem-
atic the initial allocation of quotas, but ITQs do otherwise outperform TAC-
regulation, and seems to be the most effective measures to reduce overfishing 
(Costello et al. 2008). 
 
Weitzman (2002) presents an important contribution in case of choice of in-
strument under uncertainties about recruitment. He compared taxes (in the form 
of landing fees) with quantity regulation (in form of auctioned ITQs), and con-
cludes that taxes perform better (in terms of reaching the first-best result). This 
result comes about because the number of ITQs has to be determined before the 
fishermen fish. The tax is first paid when the fishermen land their catches. In 
this way the tax uses the information that is revealed to the fishermen. There-
fore, Weitzman concludes that the tax mechanism is more flexible than ITQs. If 
there is economic uncertainty in form of unknown economic parameters the re-
sult is however not clear-cut, see Jensen and Vestergaard (2003) and Hannesson 
and Kennedy (2005). 
3.4.  Monitoring 
A fishery rebuilding plan is based on implicitly division of the involved vari-
ables into target, decision and exogenous variables. Stock biomass and fishing 
mortality are examples of target variables (sometime also called outcome vari-
ables). An economic outcome variable is profit. Exogenous variables are envi-
ronmental factors (climate changes) or other impacts which are outside the con- 
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trol of the manager or outside the boundaries of the plan. Decision variables are 
the variables that the manager can change to influence the outcome, in our case 
the fisheries management system, e.g. TACs combined by limited entry etc. 
 
The overall performance of such a system is very depended of information 
about the target variables. These variables are latent variables, meaning that 
they cannot be observed directly and has to be inferred. The size of the stock 
biomass is determined in biological assessment models where catches of the 
fishermen is a very important input variable. In these models the actual fishing 
mortality is also determined. It seems therefore very important that the manag-
ers design the monitoring and enforcement system in such a way that the re-
ported catches reflect the actual catches. As indicated below one of the main 
problems in the EU cod rebuilding plan has been that the reported catches (i.e. 
landings) did not reflect the actual catches. This makes it very difficult to do re-
liable biological assessment which is a prerequisite for fisheries rebuilding 
plans. 
 
We will not elaborate more on the monitoring and enforcement issue, just em-
phasize that it is important that the variables, the plan is based on, can be in-
ferred or observed. 
4.  How risks and uncertainties can influence outcomes 
of rebuilding plans 
As specified in section 3.1, rebuilding plans ideally should consider a number 
of issues. Each such issue is relevant for the design of the fisheries rebuilding 
plan and each point has potential risk and uncertainties attached to it, which has 
to be considered. E.g., which target to choose influences the level of uncer-
tainty? (or targets could be chosen so as to reduce the prevailing uncertainty). A 
stock target will be difficult exactly to reach if there is uncertainty about the 
stock/recruitment relationship. In such cases, other measures might contain less  
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uncertainty, like fish mortality. It should also be considered how many  re-
sources is needed to provide the necessary information.  
4.1.  Risks and uncertainties related to design of the rebuilding plan 
Roughgarden and Smith (1996) define a biological target as ecological stability, 
which is achieved if the target stock is above the level that produces maximum 
sustainable yield and the harvest level is less than the maximum sustainable 
yield. The benefit of such a relatively high target is “natural insurance”, which 
is relevant in cases with environmental fluctuations that could drive lower stock 
towards extinction. This approach builds upon the precautionary principle. Ac-
cording to Randall (2009), the precautionary principle is fundamentally a claim 
that acting to avoid and/or mitigate threats of serious harm should be accorded 
high priority in public policy. Moreover, Randall (2009) compares principle of 
precaution with ordinary risk management and finds that risk management not 
only has to consider means of reducing risk (to an acceptable level), but also to 
consider the costs and benefits of such risk reduction. As a consequence, in re-
lation to application of precautionary principle/approach it seems to be that call-
ing upon the principle imply a larger weighting on risk reduction. In conclusion, 
in cases of large uncertainties, and without possibilities to resolve these uncer-
tainties, and with a non-zero probability that a very averse event could happen 
(e.g., extinction of the stock) then advocating for a “biological buffer” as de-
fined by Roughgarden and Smith (1996) makes sense. 
 
According to ICES (2001) a stock outside safe biological limits will suffer in-
creased risk of low recruitment, i.e. average recruitment will be lower than if 
the stock were at its full reproductive capacity. This causes a reduction of the 
potential catch fisheries can take from the stock. A stock that suffers severely 
reduced productivity is considered to be "collapsed”. A stock "outside safe bio-
logical limits" is not, however, usually at risk of extinction. In ICES (2001), it is 
stated that ICES recognizes that changes in fisheries systems are only slowly 
reversible, difficult to control, not well understood, and subject to change in the  
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environment and human values (see also FAO, 1996). Therefore ICES agrees 
that a precautionary approach should be applied to fishery management. Refer-
ence points, stated in terms of fishing mortality rates or biomass and manage-
ment plans are key concepts in implementing a precautionary approach (see 
also the UN Fish Stocks Agreement from 1982, where the precautionary ap-
proach is explicitly linked to reference points).  
 
We should, however, note that the precautionary approach should only be used 
when uncertainties are large, and not resolvable and the risk of adverse effect 
sufficiently high. Otherwise, an ordinary risk management approach is prefer-
able.  
4.2.  Risks and uncertainties related to implementation and monitoring 
of the rebuilding plan 
The implementation phase covers the time span from having agreed upon a spe-
cific plan until the results materialize in terms of improvement of the resource. 
According to Table 2, a variety of risk and uncertainties are attached to this 
phase and may impact the rebuilding trajectory. 
 
Both economic, biological, environmental and political risk and uncertainties 
have to be addressed. As an example of this, according to Horwood et al 
(2006), monitoring the progress of North Sea cod rebuilding is hampered by 
considerable uncertainties in stock assessments associated with low stock size, 
variable survey indices, and inaccurate catch data. In addition, questions arise 
as to whether rebuilding targets are achievable in a changing natural environ-
ment. Disentangling of the effects is important in relation to possible reactions. 
Therefore a mechanic adjustment rule under uncertainty is not adequate. If it 
can be verified with high confidence that deviations from the scheduled plans 
are caused mainly by temporal anomalies in the natural climate (e.g., due to an 
El Niño or an abnormal NAO
9), and not due to too high fishery pressures, then 
                                                            
9   NOA stands for North Atlantic Oscillation.  
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adjustments need not to be made.
10 But if the change in the environment is per-
manent then the targets and the rebuilding trajectory has to be adjusted. 
5.  Risk (and uncertainty) assessment and management 
and communication 
As a starting point in a formal decision process, one of the most important tasks 
is to find all possible alternatives and calculate /consider the consequences (in 
our case economic and biological). However, such a process is difficult when 
uncertainties are present. 
5.1.  Review the methods and mechanisms for assessing risk and uncer-
tainties 
The risk assessment matrix (Table 2) shows the whole range of risk and uncer-
tainties that potentially has to be taken into account when considering the out-
come of a fisheries rebuilding plan. The assessment of risk and uncertainties 
should not only serve as an input to risk management, but importantly it should 
be stressed that e.g. instrument choice also affects the level of uncertainty.  
 
Francis and Shotton (1997) quote various authors’ definition of risk assessment 
and extract a general definition of risk assessment as: “Using information on the 
status and dynamics of the fishery to present fishery managers with probabilis-
tic descriptions the likely effects of alternative future management options”. 
Such a description seems most used for risk assessment of the biological devel-
opment. According to Francis and Shotton (1997), all the risk assessment com-
prises of three elements, inputs, models and outputs. (The authors present ex-
amples related to stock assessment). Inputs refer to data that has to be used, like 
                                                            
10   O’Brien et al., 2000 argue that for the North Sea, the precise form of any recruit-stock-
temperature relationship is highly model-dependent. Nevertheless, it appears that two strong 
pressures are acting together to depress recruitment. According to the authors, separating these 
two effects is scientifically challenging, with no definitive solution at this time.  
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catch data or growth rate of the stock. Uncertainty is added by stochastic proc-
esses, and a model can be constructed /simulated. The output is a prediction 
/forecast of the likelihood of various outputs from a given rebuilding plan. An 
example of such an analysis is given in Horwood et al. (2006), where they esti-
mate the probability of cod rebuilding in the North Sea as a function of fish 
mortality F. Such simulation e.g. showed that reducing F to 80 % of Fpa, gives a 
low probability of rebuilding, while cutting F to 60% gave a high probability of 
rebuilding within ten years. It is also noted that the results are not that robust, 
because they are sensitive to starting conditions and to the specification of the 
stock-recruitment function. The same type of reasoning has been used by the 
IPCC to describe temperature increases by means of probabilistic forecasts for a 
given socio-economic scenarios. Such an approach involves a series of potential 
uncertainties, both related to process, data and model uncertainties.  
 
Assessing economic and political risk and uncertainties is normally not done in 
such a fashion on a micro level, e.g. assessing the effects that a specific fishery 
rebuilding plan has on the level of discard. Most microeconomic models pro-
vide qualitative, not probabilistic, statements. The same is valid for assessment 
of political uncertainties. Simulations of such models are possible, but needs 
parameter assumptions and model assumptions that make simulations less ro-
bust than biological risk assessments.  
5.2.  How to deal with imperfect and incomplete data  
It is possible to identify several ways to deal with the issue of incomplete data. 
This can be handled by use of models or simulations, by improvement of the 
quality of information, by use of indicators, or by including uncertainty into de-
cision making process. It should be noted that these points are not exclusively, 
and proper decision making includes all.
11 
  
                                                            
11  Improving quality, should consider the cost of providing better information with the expected 
benefit of doing so. That is, not all information improvement is necessarily desirable.   
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One of the most common used ways to present information is by use of indica-
tors. Garcia and Stables (2000) define fisheries indicators as “a variable, a 
pointer, an index related to criterion. Its fluctuations reveal the variations in 
those key attributes of sustainability in the ecosystem, the fishery resource or 
the sector and social and economic well being. The position and trend of the in-
dicator in relation to the rebuilding plans or values indicate the present state and 
dynamics of the system”. Ideally, indicators may measure productivity, bio-
mass, exploitation rate, but also ecosystem, spatial, habitat and environmental 
together with socio-economic characteristics (Caddy, 2004). 
 
Given the potential lack or imprecision of data and the need to measure pro-
gress in fishery rebuilding plans, the issue of finding and using appropriate in-
dicators is a crucial exercise. In case of uncertainty, agreement on which indica-
tors to use is a relevant and an important task, because it might circumvent the 
lack of data. As an example is the usage of landing data to describe the devel-
opment in stock. In order to be used in a decision making process, it is, how-
ever, necessary that the attached uncertainty in such estimates is specified. The 
reason is obvious, as already discussed in previous sections; the amount of un-
certainty will determine the optimal rebuilding strategy. E.g., the decision to 
apply a precautionary approach also depends on the level of uncertainties in the 
data.  
5.3.  Communication of risk and uncertainties 
According to WHO (2009), risk communication is an interactive process of ex-
change of information and opinion on risk among risk assessors, risk managers, 
and other interested parties. It is a process to get mutual understanding between 
regulator and the regulated, and to get alignment of interests and targets. In part 
due to acceptance and implementation, in part because stakeholders might pos-
sess relevant information, or will get access to information (e.g., stock size due 
to experience at sea). Making the fishermen an integral parts of the risk analysis 
process might increase their willingness to share such information. It is there- 
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fore also a mean of reducing the risk. That the stakeholder fell that they are an 
integral part of the decision process is according to McColl et al. (2000) a ne-
cessity to get acceptance for the plan.  
 
Risk communication is in this light first and foremost seen in relation to reduc-
ing the uncertainty with respect to implementation. Communication relates par-
ticularly to the interaction between assessments and decisions and between de-
cisions and implementation. The basic purpose is to make the rebuilding plan 
understandable for the relevant stakeholders by specifying its target, and the 
choice of instrument choice. It is important that the whole decision process can 
be specified including all the considered alternatives. Also important is to 
communicate the uncertainties present, and the measurement/indicators that 
will be used, as already discussed in section 5.2. It can be argued that the ap-
plied indicators translated into monetary terms, or something that is meaningful 
for the fishery managers, fishermen and other interested parties, are preferable. 
Therefore, proper risk communication between the scientific community and 
the decision makers must also be well functioning. 
 
However, risk communication also relates to the design phase, used to elucidate 
valuable information about relevant issues. Stakeholder may bring information 
and perspectives on the table that are critical to the decision process. Fishermen 
may hold information about economic variables, knowledge about 
catch/discard/by-catches, ideas about expected reactions upon specific regula-
tion measures. All this might provide information about the cost of being sub-
jected to various regulation instruments.  
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6.  Examples of cases where risk and uncertainties have 
not been addressed 
We have selected two cases where rebuilding plans have been used, namely in 
EU and USA. The choice was based on the range of knowledge we had about 
rebuilding plans at the time we wrote the report. 
6.1.  North Sea cod   
The first cod rebuilding plan was implemented primo 2004, one year after it 
was made possible in the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) from ultimo 2002, and 
over 21 years after the spawning stock biomass (SSB) was lower than Bpa the 
first time. The formulation of Bpa and Blim followed the implementation of the 
precautionary approach in EU fisheries in the second part of the 1990’ties. 
Since then ICES has recommended huge reductions in fishing mortality, be-
cause the SSB was way below the Bpa and also Blim, which is the level where 
there is a high probability of low or impaired recruitment and equal to the low-
est observed SSB level (in 1999). However since then, the SSB has been lower 
than Blim, but since 2006 the SSB has been increasing, see Table 3. 
 
The rebuilding plan from 2004 (EC 2004) stipulated a harvest control rule and 
regulations to limit the fishing effort. The harvest rule was based on a target 
biomass of 150,000, the Bpa level. So, if the biomass is lower than Bpa then the 
TAC has to be set so it allows for an increase at minimum 30% of SSB and the 
fishing mortality rate cannot be higher than 0.65, which corresponds to the level 
for Fpa. Finally, except for 2005 the changes of the TAC cannot be more than 
15% each year. If the SSB level is lower than 70,000 - the Blim level - then the 
Council shall determine a TAC which is lower than what the above described 
rule says. The effect of the plan on the size of the TAC was basically nothing, 
because the Council – even though the SSB was lower than Blim – kept a TAC 
level at 27,300 tons like the years 2003 and 2004. The TAC was reduced in 
2006 and 2007 by 15% which was the normal rule, but because the SSB was  
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below Blim a more strengthen rule should have be followed according to the re-
building plan. The rebuilding plan did also contain regulation with respect to 
limitations of fishing effort. Further, the plan included new measures on moni-
toring and inspection of vessels. The limitation of fishing effort was defined as 
maximum number of sea-at-sea per month depending on the gear type and the 
mesh size. 
 
In 2008, a new rebuilding plan was implemented and in force from 2009. The 
plan again formulates a target, a harvest control rule and a transition period. 
The target is not expressed in terms of stock biomass. Now the target is a fish-
ing mortality rate at 0.4, which is estimated to correspond to the MSY-level. 
This rate is much lower than Fpa (from 2004). Climate changes were one of the 
reasons for leaving the stock biomass as a target variable, because it has an un-
controlled impact on the biomass. In the transition period, the fishing mortality 
rate in 2009 is 75% of the level in 2008, in 2010 65% of the level in 2008, con-
tinuing with a decrease of 10%-point each year. The long-term harvest control 
rule says that fishing mortality has to be reduced below 0.4 when the SSB is be-
tween Bpa and Blim according to the formula: F = 0.4 – 0.2*(Bpa-B)/(Bpa-Blim). 
When SSB is less than Blim then the fishing mortality has be less than 0.2. How-
ever, the changes in TAC from year to year have to be less than 20%. The tran-
sition period ends when the TAC calculated following the transition rules is less 
than the TAC obtained from following the long term rules. The rules limiting 
the fishing effort were changed to a system based on kilo-watt-days. These days 
were made permanent transferable between vessels. Another change was that 
the basis of the fishing effort system is a maximum allowable number of fishing 
days to each vessel group in the member states. By this the overall number of 
fishing days applied in the fishery is limited. 
 
The ICES Advice for 2010 is to follow the rebuilding plan, i.e. a fishing mortal-
ity level at 65% of the F in 2008 leading to catches less than 66,400 tons. As-
suming discards rates at a level as observed in 2008, this implies landings of 
less than 40,300 tons in 2010. The rebuilding plan from 2004 did not explicitly  
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address the involved risk and uncertainties, so no formal overall risk analysis 
and/or risk assessment was executed. Implicitly, however, the uncertainties 
were addressed by ICES using the precautionary approach.
12 By introducing 
limitations on the use of inputs in the fishery, one can argue that the implemen-
tation uncertainty created by the lack of compliance with the TAC was ad-
dressed, because effort control would reduce the fishing mortality all things 
equal. The rebuilding plan from 2008 recognises that the stock is influenced by 
environmental factors and therefore a stock biomass target is not appropriate. It 
is too early to assess the results of this 2008 plan, but again a formal and coher-
ent risk assessment was not executed. The regulations of use of inputs were fur-
ther tightening reflecting that the fishing mortality has not adjusted enough. In 
general, both plans are relatively complicated and with respect to risk commu-
nication the plans do not take the socio-economic impacts in fishery sector of 
e.g. closure into consideration. The 2004 plan did not specify clearly what to do 
in cases where the stock biomass was assessed to be lower than Blim. 
 
 
                                                            
12  ICES implemented generally the precautionary approach in 1998, where the first reference 
point occurred (González-Laxe, 2004).  
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Table 3. Development in SSB, F, landings and discards since 1999, North 
Sea cod, Tons (ICES 2009) 
  SSB F  Landings  Discards  Catches
1  Agreed 
TAC 
ICES advice 
1999 74,317 1.167  96,2  14,2  138,457  132,000  F=0.60 
2000 49,052 1.074  71,4  13,7  96,179  81,000  F<0.81 
2001  38,830  0.801  49,7  13,9  75,895  48,600  Lowest possible catch 
2002  47,150  0.790  54,9  5,7  81,559  49,300  Lowest possible catch 
2003 43,644 0.930  30,9  6,4  76,695  27,300  Closure 
2004 40,050 0.903  28,2  5,8  53,925  27,300  Zero  catch 
2005 36,564 0.725  28,7  6,3  51,858  27,300  Zero  catch 
2006 34,475 0.694  26,6  8,1  53,268  23,200  Zero  catch 
2007 42,313 0.619  24,4  23,6  70,102  20,000  Zero  catch 
2008  57,282  0.788  26,8  21,8  90,687  22,200  Total removals < 22,000 
2009 60,139          28,800  Zero  catch 
1 The catch figure is estimated by ICES. 
 
According to Horwood et al (2006), monitoring the progress of North Sea cod 
rebuilding is hampered by considerable uncertainties in stock assessments asso-
ciated with low stock size, variable survey indices, and inaccurate catch data. 
This observation is confirmed by looking at the disparity between landings plus 
discards and catches in the Table 3. In addition, questions arise as to whether 
rebuilding targets are achievable in a changing natural environment. There are 
therefore significant uncertainties with the assessment of North Sea cod. These 
uncertainties appear particularly in estimates of the most recent annual rate of 
fishing mortality (F). The current assessment relies upon three sets of research 
surveys to calibrate the assessment: a spring international bottom trawl survey 
and autumn Scottish and English surveys. Since the current landings figures do 
not reflect the actual catches the assessment is not based on these figures. This 
point to considerable biological uncertainty about the cod stock (growth and 
stock size) and therefore the use of the precautionary approach seems appropri-
ate in this case.  
 
There has been significant political uncertainty involved, because the setting of 
TACs in several years didn’t follow the rebuilding plan. This does not allow the  
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fishermen to make longer term planning. Combined these two types of uncer-
tainties leads to a myopic behaviour where the fishermen prefer sure short run 
catches instead of longer term uncertain higher catches. In that sense, the re-
building plan is not creating the necessary medium and long term planning pos-
sibilities and incentives. The revision in 2008 of the rebuilding plan did not ad-
dress neither the incentives of the fishermen, so the considerable implementa-
tion uncertainty was maintained. The biological uncertainties are mainly due to 
lack of reliable catch data making the assessment of fishing mortalities and 
stock biomass to be more an art than science. Since the rebuilding plan is based 
on these variables, the scientific foundation tends to be unreliable. The lack of 
improvement in the size of the stock biomass also points to more fundamental 
problems with the plan. In a market economy overfishing is due to wrong eco-
nomic incentives and reducing fishing mortality will mean that it has to be less 
profitable to catch cod today and more profitable to investment in the fish stock. 
Rebuilding plans need goals and targets, but the tools or means to achieve the 
targets have to be better chosen. To sum up, solving or reducing the economic 
and political uncertainties may therefore all things equal lead to a smaller the 
biological uncertainty. 
6.2.  US fisheries rebuilding plans 
In 1996 the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA) was approved and implemented 
into US fisheries policy. It allows NOAA
13 to formulate fisheries with the pri-
mary goal of preventing overfishing, rebuilding overfished stocks and protect-
ing essential fish habitat.
14 In particular, the SFA changed the requirements to 
prevent overfishing and to rebuild overfished fisheries. Each fishery manage-
ment plan (FMP) was required to specify measurable objective for determining, 
when a stock is overfished or when overfishing is going on. The overall defini-
tions of overfishing and overfished are based on fishing mortality and stock 
                                                            
13   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
14   And also minimizing bycatch, enhanced research and improved monitoring.  
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biomass, respectively. The definitions are: “A stock that is subject to overfish-
ing has a fishing mortality (harvest) rate above the level that provides for the 
maximum sustainable yield. A stock that is overfished has a biomass level be-
low a biological threshold specified in its fishery management plan”. (The two 
levels correspond to Fthreshold, and Bthreshold in Figure 1, respectively). Included in 
the plans is in many cases four reference points, two threshold and two target 
points. The threshold points for fishing mortality are either FMSY or a lower 
value if the stock biomass is very low. So most often, if the ratio Factual/FMSY is 
higher than 1 (Fthrehold) then there is overfishing. The threshold points for stock 
biomass are the maximum of either BMSY*0.5 or a stock level where it will take 
up to 10 years to rebuild the stock to BMSY applying FMSY. So for many stocks, if 
the ratio between actual biomass and BMSY (Bactual/BMSY) is less than 0.5 (Bthreshold) 
then the fish stock is overfished. The target points for the biomass is BMSY, while 
for fishing mortality the target point is normally FMSY, se Figure 1. Note that the 
precautionary threshold will be the BMSY level if known. The default precaution-
ary threshold will be 40% of the estimated unfished biomass level. 
 
This gives very straight forward measures of overfishing and overfished. The 
main issue in these plans is to formulate and implement management initiatives 
to secure that fishing mortality and stock biomass stay within safe limits, i.e. 
away from passing the thresholds. In Figure 1 a case is shown with overfishing 
and where the stock is overfished in the first years. The rebuilding plans have as 
the goal to move fishing mortality below FMSY and the stock above BMSY*0.5 
within 10 years. Applying the logistic growth function the threshold for the 
stock biomass is ¼ of the carrying capacity. If the biomass is below ¼ of the 
carrying capacity then the stock is overfished. This threshold is a little bit lower 
than the threshold (around 30%) proposed by Sethi et al. (2004) when there is 
uncertainty in the stock measurement.  
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Based on the status with respect to overfishing and overfished, fisheries man-
agement plans are formulated included management measures. As an example, 
for the Pacific Groundfish fishery this involves a whole range of technical 
measures, seasonal limitations and limited entry programs based on gear types. 
These measures are further restricted or adjusted yearly in order to fulfill the 
goals of the fishery management plan. 
 
The SFA was approved in 1996 and shortly hereafter in function. In 2006 
Rosenberg et al. published a study which showed that nine years later overfish-
ing and overfished stocks are still a major problem in US Fisheries. They find 
that overfishing continued in 45% of the stocks managed by rebuilding plans, 
while over 70% of the stocks were still overfished. While over 45% of the 
stocks under rebuilding have experienced increasing biomass, only 3 stocks 
have been rebuilt to BMSY.
15 They conclude that the main cause of slow progress 
is the failure in many cases to reduce the fishing mortality sufficient. The goal 
                                                            
15   Every year NOAA published an index showing the aggregate development in the health of the 
stocks. The Fish Stock Sustainability Index (FSSI) is a performance measure for the sustain-
ability of 230 U.S. fish stocks selected for their importance to commercial and recreational 
fisheries. This index has been growing since 2000 by around 55%. This index can however also 
change if the stock previously not assessed becomes assessed, but the main part of the increase 
in the index is due to overfishing not happening and that the stock is not overfished. So, the 
overall conclusion is that in general the health of the fish stocks is improving in the US (Worms 
et al 2009), but the assessment in 2009 was that overfishing still happens for around 20% of the 







Fthreshold  1  
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of rebuilding in 10 years is therefore rarely meet. While there may be biological 
and environmental reasons for this, the mean reason is, as pointed out by 
Rosenberg et al. (2006), difficulties in reducing fishing mortality, i.e. economic 
and management reason. The guidelines at the NOAA web-site do not, as we 
see it, include this aspect in the design phase of the rebuilding plan. 
7.  Conclusion and guidelines 
A number of guidelines emerge from the analysis 
 
  Fisheries rebuilding plans should be dealt inside a formal decision making 
process. 
  Fisheries rebuilding plans should be as simple, realistic and credible as 
possible. 
  Fisheries rebuilding plans should consider both biological as well as eco-
nomic consequences. 
  The possibility of measurement should be considered in all phases of the 
process. 
  Risk communication should be used to improve the probability of imple-
mentation success. 
  A formal risk analysis should be performed.  
  The precautionary approach should be applied in accordance with the 
level of uncertainty.  
 
First of all, since deciding upon fisheries rebuilding plans essentially is a deci-
sion problem, application of a (rational) decision making process (model) is 
warranted (See Figure 2 for a schematic overview of this process. see also 
Clemen, 1992). In such a process, first the problem is recognized, and analyzed, 
where after the objective is specified, possible actions (instruments, plans) are 
considered of how to reach the proposed objective. It is argued in e.g. Clemen 
(1992) that considering the precise objectives is all-important. However, also a  
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very important part is that for each of these actions the consequences are as-
sessed, and finally the action is chosen that best reaches the targets given some 
criteria. This could be reaching the objectives in a least-cost way or in a least-
risky way. Hereafter the plan is implemented and progress assessed. The key to 
this framework is that all the stages are interconnected, in the sense that in the 
process of working with the decision making model, as new information and in-
sights are gained, adjustments in the plan should be considered.  
 
Consequences should consist of both economic and biological variables. Under-
standing the economic reality surrounding the fishery that has to be rebuilt is 
essential with respect to considering implementation success: How will fisher-
men or the industry reacts to the proposed plan, and what are the consequences 
in terms of profitability, entry, exit and so on? The potential drawback of not 
including economic and behavioral consideration cannot be exaggerated. 
 
Figure 2.  The stages in a decision process model  
1. Identification of the problem (e.g. low stock, falling catches). 
2. Stating the objectives. 
3. Identify alternatives (type of rebuilding plans: instruments, timeframe, ad-
justment, observations, monitoring). 
4. Consider the consequences of each plan (both with respect to biological 
and socio-economic consequences).  
5. Is further analysis needed? (If yes, go back to 2 and/or 3 and /or 4).  
6. Choosing the best alternative. 
7. Implement the chosen alternative. 
8. Monitoring and feed-back. 
 
Even though it might be difficult to compare economic and biological conse-
quences, the process of evaluating them will often help prioritizing. Moreover, 
under uncertainties, there might be problems in assessing the consequences and 
efforts should be made to assess these. The mere process of assessing risk and  
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uncertainties will yield valuable information (using the risk assessment ap-
proach as done in Table 1 could serve helpful). Since different plans result in 
different types and levels of uncertainties, a formal risk analysis at this point 
may yield important insights. Each potential rebuilding plan should also be 
evaluated with respect to the possibilities of measuring or assessing progress in 
the essential variables stated in the objective. If a plan turns out to be difficult to 
measure, or data is expected to be lacking, then it might be useful to consider 
other plans. As an example of this, consider the choice of instrument to regulate 
the fishermen. A plan containing one overall instrument (e.g., ITQ) presumably 
provides less uncertainty than a multi instrument plan containing, e.g. a TAC 
combined with a range of input restrictions. Furthermore, it is essential to stress 
the importance of the implementation phase. A plan that is not assessed likely 
to be successfully implementable has to be revised. One way to increase the 
likelihood of implementation success is to include the stakeholders like fisher-
men into the process. In an advanced risk communication process this is rele-
vant both because participation increases willingness to do as required, and be-
cause it can be a tool to gather information. As discussed in this paper, there 
need to be objective reasons for applying the precautionary principle. One such 
reason is a positive probability that a non-precautionary approach will end in a 
collapse of the fishery, or that processes of uncertain due to e.g. climatic 
changes have a potential negative impact on the stock. Finally, the continued 
process of monitoring and feed-back is also important: If the plan does not 
work as planned, then this creates a new problem, for which the decision mak-
ing model can be applied once more. 
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